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Abstract
Healthcare is among the leading industries targeted by cyber-criminals. 
Ransomware exploits vulnerabilities to hijack target information technology (IT) 
infrastructures for monetary gain. Due to the nature and value of information, 
access to medical information enables cyber-criminals to commit identity theft, 
medical fraud, and extortion, and illegally obtain controlled substances. The 
utility and versatility of medical information, extensive centralized storage of 
medical information, relatively weak IT security systems, and the expanding use 
of healthcare IT infrastructure all contribute to an increase in cyber-attacks on 
healthcare entities. Research suggests that an individual’s medical information is 
20–50 times more valuable to cyber-criminals than personal financial information. 
As such, cyber-attacks targeting medical information are increasing 22% per year. 
This chapter explores the history of ransomware attacks in healthcare, ransomware 
types, ransom payment, healthcare vulnerabilities, implications for international 
health security, and means of institutional protection.
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1. Introduction
Healthcare is among the leading industries targeted by cyber-criminals 
[1]. Malware, or malicious software, refers to programs designed to infiltrate 
computers without the users’ consent, and includes threats such as viruses and 
ransomware. Ransomware, a version of malware, exploits vulnerabilities to hijack 
target information technology (IT) infrastructures for monetary gain. Health 
information is an attractive target for cyber-criminals, as research suggests that 
an individual’s medical information is 20–50 times more valuable than personal 
financial information [1]. Access to medical information enables cyber-criminals 
to commit identity theft, medical fraud, and extortion, and illegally obtain 
controlled substances. The utility, versatility, and centralized storage of medical 
information, relatively weak IT security systems, and expanding use of healthcare 
IT (HIT) infrastructure all contribute to an increase in cyber-attacks on healthcare 
entities [1]. In fact, cyber-attacks targeting medical information are increasing 
≥22% annually [1]. Depending on completeness, recency, and accuracy, a single 
patient’s file may fetch hundreds to thousands of dollars on the Dark Web [2, 3]. 
In Australia, it has been reported that the medical card number of every citizen is 
for sale on the Dark Web [3]. Moreover, attack-associated costs are reported to cost 
$1–3.7 million USD to clean up, with an average downtime cost per attack being 
$141,000 USD [1, 4–6]. A study by IBM and the Ponemon Institute reported that 
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cyber breaches in the United States (U.S.) cost up to $6.2 billion per year and that 
almost 90% of hospitals have reported a data breach [7].
2. Search strategy
A literature search was performed of: China National Knowledge Infrastructure 
(CHKD-CNKI), Cochrane CENTRAL, CINAHL, Directory of Open Access Journals 
(DOAJ), Embase, Korean Journal Database (KCI), Latin American and Caribbean 
Health Sciences Literature (LILACS), IEEE-Xplorer, information/Chinese Scientific 
Journals database (CSJD-VIP), Google Scholar, Magiran, PsycInfo, PubMed, 
Scopus, Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO), Scientific Information 
Database (SID), TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM, Research Gate, Russian Science Citation 
Index (RSCI), and Web of Science (WoS). Relevant bibliographies were also 
searched. The search terms included the U.S. National Library of Medicine MeSH 
terms hospitals and computer security, as well as the terms ransomware, cyber security, 
web security, and healthcare.
3. What is ransomware?
Ransomware utilizes malicious software to infiltrate computer systems or 
connected devices to encrypt a user’s files in order to carry out an extortion attack 
[8, 9]. Most commonly, ransomware infects a system when its user opens a compro-
mised e-mail or visits a compromised website (i.e., drive-by downloads) [8]. Once 
downloaded, servers (i.e., web and e-mail), databases, end-user computers and 
removable media may become involved, including personal cloud storage services 
[2, 9]. The intended purpose of encryption is privacy, where someone with access to 
the encrypted data (“ciphertext”) is unable to discern its contents in a readable form 
(“plaintext”) [9]. There are two types of encryption, or cryptography: symmetric 
key and public key. In symmetric key cryptography, the sender and receiver use the 
same secret key to encrypt and decrypt the data. Public key cryptography uses a 
pair of keys: a public key (shared between both parties) and a private key (sender 
and receiver have their own unique private key) [9].
Ransomware uses a hybrid encryption system that combines the two cryptogra-
phies to create an asymmetrical cryptosystem in which data are encrypted using a 
randomly generated symmetric key, which is subsequently encrypted using a public 
key where one party has the corresponding private key [9]. The cyber-criminal 
uses the private key to decrypt the symmetric key in order to decrypt the data back 
into “plaintext” and sends the key back to the victim, who can then use it to regain 
access to their system [9].
Once encrypted, information becomes indecipherable and inaccessible. The 
user receives a pop-up notification demanding payment of a ransom (usually in 
untraceable digital currency such as bitcoin) in exchange for the decryption key 
[10]. Ransomware often does not destroy data, but rather, locks-up the data until 
a ransom is paid [11]. Even if the ransomware infection is removed, the data may 
remain encrypted [11]. But it is important to note, the mere infection of a machine 
with ransomware is not enough. The ransomware must communicate with a server 
to get an encryption key and report its results [11]. This requires a server hosted by a 
company that will ignore the illegal activity and guarantee the attackers anonymity 
(called Bulletproof Hosting) [11]. These companies are often located in China or 
Russia [11]. Attackers also use a proxy or virtual private network (VPN) services 
to further disguise their own internet protocol (IP) addresses [11]. Attack numbers 
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have grown in part because malware authors have adopted an easy-to-use modular 
design of ransomware distribution [12]. This Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) 
approach has become increasingly available, assisting technically naive attackers 
through simplistic distribution with phishing and exploitation kits, while employ-
ing a trustworthy business model [12]. RaaS is most easily accessed on the Dark 
Web [13], where prospective cyber-criminals are provided access to an affiliate 
console allowing them to walk-through the process of receiving their ransomware 
exploit kit, configure settings, target selection, and selecting ransom rates [13]. 
Metrics on malware instillations and success rates are also available [13].
3.1 Ransomware types
Ransomware can be divided into three basic types: crypto-, locker-, and wipe-
ransomware (Table 1). Although crypto- and locker-ransomware represent the two 
main categories, current variants often incorporate traits from both [8]. Crypto-
ransomware (most common) encrypts both files and data [11]. Thus, infected files 
remain inaccessible if transferred to another device [11]. Critical system files are 
typically spared, enabling the device to continue functioning, as it may be needed 
to pay the ransom [11]. Additionally, crypto-ransomware prefers bitcoin due to the 
increased privacy of cryptocurrency. However, owing to worries over law enforce-
ment, bitcoin anonymizers and laundering services have emerged.
Conversely, locker-ransomware (a less effective extortion tool) locks the device 
by creating a digital “locker” around the computer system to block access [8, 11]. 
However, unlike crypto-ransomware, the data stored on the device are typically 
untouched and can often be recovered by moving it to another functioning com-
puter for access [11]. Moreover, users may be able to remove the locker-ransomware 
remotely and avoid paying the ransom [8]. However, if remote malware removal 
is unsuccessful, ransom payments are typically made through payment voucher 
systems or cryptocurrency [8]. For example, online betting services may accept the 
Ransomware Type Examples Characteristics Data 
recoverable by 
moving files to 
another device?
Crypto- Cryptolocker
Cryptowall
CTB-Locker
KeRangera
Locky
Petya
Santana
TeslaCrypt
TorrentLocker
WannaCry
Encrypts files and data. Typically, does 
not target critical system files, thereby 
allowing the device to function as it may 
be needed to pay the ransom
No
Locker- Reveton Creates a digital locker around the 
computer system to block user’s access. 
The data on the device are typically 
untouched
Possibly
Wipe- PetrWrap Encrypts files and data. Does not unlock 
files or device after ransom payment
No
aBelieved to be the first piece of ransomware to successfully infect Mac computers (running OS X).
Table 1. 
Ransomware types and characteristics.
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voucher codes as payment, subsequently transferring the money to prepaid debit 
cards [11]. Money mules are then used to withdraw the cash.
Wipe-ransomware first appeared in 2017 with the PetrWrap attack that 
encrypted the target’s master file table (MFT) forcing the operating system (OS) to 
reboot [14]. Unlike crypto- and locker-ransomware, the files encrypted by wipe-
ransomware do not unlock it after payment, effectively resulting in data loss [14].
3.2 Ransom payment
Before 2005, online payment methods were less readily available. Victims 
were instructed to pay ransoms by sending checks to offshore accounts, SMS text 
messages, prepaid cards, or even premium rate telephone numbers that earned 
money for the attacker [11, 15]. However, these methods were risky since they were 
traceable. In 2008, the largely anonymous cryptocurrency bitcoin came into use, 
facilitating expansion of ransomware attacks [11]. The use of third-party holdings 
companies such as PayPal has provided additional payment avenues [15].
Since one’s ability to pay may vary greatly by geography and local economy, ran-
somware uses dynamic geographical pricing. Once a computer or system is infected, 
the ransomware establishes contact with its command-and-control (C&C) server, 
reports the infected device’s IP address, and the C&C server returns a price for the 
country associated with that IP address based on a pre-populated database [11]. 
Additionally, criminals more frequently target businesses than individual users 
owing to greater potential for ransom extraction. It has been reported that about 
$10,000 USD may be the optimal business ransom as it is both low enough to pay, 
and low enough to generate reluctance on the part of law enforcement to investi-
gate [11].
The decision whether to pay the ransom is critical. The U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) does not recommend paying ransoms, as only 50% of victims 
ultimately regain access to uncorrupted usable data. Further, ransom payment 
incentivizes attackers to continue exploiting healthcare targets [16]. Even so, an 
estimated 40% of organizations choose to pay the ransom in hopes of recovering 
data accessibility and mitigating further losses [17]. This may be more likely to 
occur if the hospital has a questionable backup and no business continuity [13].
Choosing not to pay, however, comes with the added costs of extended down-
time and recovery, which may approach 23 times the ransom cost [6, 18]. Smaller 
organizations have been forced to close after not paying the ransom [19]. The FBI 
estimated that in 2016 alone, ransomware-associated monetary losses exceeded 
$1 billion USD, with an average downtime cost per attack of $141,000 [4–6]. 
Ultimately, the decision of whether to pay the ransom is an individual one and 
depends on the unique circumstances and stakes of every incident.
4. Ransomware and healthcare
The targeting of healthcare by ransomware dates to 1989, when the Harvard-
trained evolutionary biologist Dr. Joseph L. Popp used malware to prey on scientists 
and organizations interested in early acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
research [1, 11]. Dr. Joseph Popp, a World Health Organization (WHO) consultant 
and AIDS researcher himself, mailed 20,000 floppy disks containing ransomware 
to a group of attendees at the WHO’s International AIDS conference [1, 11]. When 
inserted into the target’s computer, the virus (known as AIDS Program, AIDS 
Trojan, or PC Cyborg) infected the computer with a virus that lay dormant until 
the 90th time the system was re-booted, at which point a note would appear on the 
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screen asking for licensing fees to be paid while it encrypted and locked computer 
files [8, 12]. A $189 USD ransom to be mailed to a physical mailing address was 
demanded to “renew the software,” or users must forgo further use of their com-
puter [1, 8]. Although authorities apprehended Dr. Popp, his creation resulted in 
many derivatives that serve as a framework for modern cyber-criminals [1].
Over 15 years passed before the next instance of ransomware (GPCoder), 
which was delivered via e-mail [15]. Among the first major medical centers 
attacked was Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center (2016), a 400-bed hospital 
in Los Angeles, California [1, 10, 11]. Rather than pay the initial $3.7 million USD 
ransom, the hospital reverted to paper records until they were able to negotiate 
the decryption key ransom payment down to 40 bitcoins (about $17,000 USD) 
[1, 10, 11]. However, this does not account for 10 days of lost revenue while the 
hospital’s systems were inaccessible, nor does it account for a damaged reputa-
tion in patient data security. Subsequent U.S. attacks have included academic, 
government, and private healthcare systems including: Alaska Department 
of Health Office of Children’s Services (Anchorage, Alaska); Appalachian 
Regional Hospitals (Lexington, Kentucky); Berkshire Health Systems (Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts); Emory Healthcare (Atlanta, Georgia); Hancock Regional Hospital 
(Greenfield, Indiana); Heritage Valley Health System (Pennsylvania); Medstar 
(Baltimore, Maryland); Kansas Heart Hospital (Wichita, Kansas); Keck Medicine 
of the University of Southern California (Los Angeles, California); Los Angeles 
Health Department (Los Angeles, California); Methodist Hospital (Henderson, 
Kentucky); National Capital Poison Center (Washington, D.C.); Princeton 
Community Hospital (Princeton, West Virginia); J.W. Ruby Memorial Hospital of 
West Virginia University (Morgantwown, West Virgina); University of Buffalo and 
State University of New York (Buffalo, New York); and Verity Medical Foundation 
(San Jose, California) [9, 10, 12, 20, 21]. Additionally, health insurance companies 
have also been targeted [7]. The Anthem Blue Cross insurance company (USA) had 
over 78 million medical records stolen in 2015 [7].
This problem, however, is far from constrained to U.S. entities; it is global. On 
May 12, 2017, a ransomware (WannaCry) that utilized a stolen National Security 
Agency (NSA) tool that highlighted a vulnerability of the Windows OS (MS17-010) 
infected more than 300,000 computers in at least 150 countries [12]. Sixty trusts 
within the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) experienced system-
wide lockouts forcing at least 16 hospital closures, ambulance diversions, inability 
to access patient records, patient care delays (canceled appointments and elective 
surgeries), and function loss in connected devices such as MRI scanners and blood 
storage refrigerators [3, 21–23]. Five hospitals, including Barts Health (Royal 
London Hospital), one of the main trauma centers in London, had to close their 
emergency departments [7]. Similarly, the Singapore Health System experienced a 
breach of over 1 million patient records, including those of the Prime Minister [7].
4.1 Why is healthcare vulnerable?
The rise in healthcare attacks in the U.S. may be linked to the enactment of the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 
2009 [24]. This identified healthcare organizations as potential cash cows for cyber-
criminals. Prior to 2008, only 9.4% of hospitals had adopted a basic electronic health 
records (EHR) system [8]. By 2014, 75.5% of hospitals had adopted basic EHRs [8], 
and now approximately 95% use them [12]. Additionally, HIT including glucose 
meters, infusion pumps, and implanted medical devices are also connected to, and 
dependent on, the hospital’s network [12]. Moreover, healthcare systems are twice 
as likely to have Flash (Adobe Inc., San Jose, USA) installed and three times as likely 
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to have Java (Sun Microsystems, Santa Clara, USA) installed, two plugins that can be 
exploited by hackers [8]. Healthcare organizations have been focused on healthcare, 
not cyber security, thus several issues have increased their vulnerability over time. 
While aiming to improve care efficiency, increasingly connected technology allowing 
for multiple ways to connect to easily accessible medical devices increases the likeli-
hood of a breach [3]. Also, the interface between HIT systems and mobile general-
purpose consumer devices (e.g., smart phones) increases the challenge to protect 
PHI. Moreover, no U.S. federal or state law requires encryption for PHI. Though 
encryption is encouraged, and often incentivized, nothing requires covered entities 
to utilize even the minimum standard of encryption [8]. Lastly, cyber-security fund-
ing is lacking, contributing to time lags between breech occurrence and detection [3].
Importantly, not all ransomware- and malware-generated traffic patterns are 
distinguishable from the normal traffic patterns generated by medical devices and 
systems with networking capabilities [21]. In this sense, both a malware encrypting 
a shared folder and an application compressing the same files have similar traffic 
patterns. Moreover, normal changes in the clinical environment may be misinter-
preted as attacks if detection mechanisms adapt improperly [21]. Furthermore, 
malware developers are increasingly using encrypted traffic to avoid payload 
inspection [21]. Thus, achieving an acceptable balance between detection and false 
alarm rates remains challenging. A high false alarm rate may frustrate administra-
tors and users, whereas a low detection rate may herald inefficacy.
Despite the growth of new technologies, many healthcare organizations persist 
in using legacy systems. For example, the use of Window XP (not supported since 
2014) by some facilities allowed WannaCry to avoid detection [3]. Additionally, the 
proprietary nature of medical device software may prevent HIT teams from access-
ing internal device software, resulting in reliance on manufacturers to design and 
maintain effective device security [3]. Facilities in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMIC) may be at added risk owing to their use of open-source EMRs whose 
security may not be rigorously maintained.
Lastly, outsourcing may play a role in healthcare organization vulnerability. 
Health insurance niche software and service vendors are offering outsourcing 
as a remedy for organizational cost controls [9]. However, offshore outsourcing 
companies are mostly self-regulated [9]. There is currently no standard as to how 
a healthcare provider may ensure that offshore business associates are adequately 
protecting the electronic PHI of their patients.
4.2 Implications of international health security
With the dominance of ransomware as a leading cyber-security threat, it is 
important to consider its impact on International Health Security (IHS) [25]. Many 
countries lack the legal infrastructure to prosecute such crimes. Globally, cyber-
attacks may result in substantial loss of resources, money, and life [26]. Although 
many security threats have emerged from LMIRs, many of these regions lag behind 
higher income regions in implementation of automated technologies and EMRs in 
the medical sector. That said, the IHS community is actively endeavoring to increase 
the availability and use of these technologies in LMIRs [27]. Thus, with falling costs 
and rising availability and implementation, HIT security will have an increasingly 
important role in IHS in upcoming years.
Traditional charting and management methodologies are steadily being replaced 
with digital ones. Technologies including digital algorithms and artificial intelligence 
are increasingly being used to monitor and coordinate threat responses [28, 29]. 
The IHS community has come to increasingly rely upon digital global surveil-
lance networks such as the ProMED-mail (PMM) Network and the World Health 
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Dimension Role Recommendation
Leadership • Establish a Board-Level Information Technology 
(IT) Committee
• Hire a Chief Information Security Officer (CIO)
• IT security should be under the control of executives 
with extensive IT experience (e.g., CIO)
Physical safeguards Prevention and 
preparation
• Buildings and equipment access to protect against 
unauthorized access and theft
Hardware and 
software
Prevention and 
preparation
• Encrypt sensitive practice data
• Perform regular back-ups. Store 1 copy off-line
• Consider tools such as ShieldFS© or Redemption to 
create real-time safe-guarded copies of attacked files
• Maintain a “gold image” of system configurations; 
this allows one to reset systems to the pre-attack state
• Test backup’s restore function regularly (e.g., 
quarterly or yearly)
• Patch management for operating system, application 
software, browsers, plug-ins, firmware, and anti-virus 
software
• Make sure the firewall is properly configured
• Segment the network by categorizing IT assets (e.g., 
desktops, servers, routers), data, and personnel into 
groups, and restricting access to these groups using 
entry and exit traffic filtering
Incident Response • Disconnect the infected computers from the network
• Turn off wireless network functionality of the 
infected machine
• If widespread, shut down all network operations to 
prevent further spread
Clinical content Intrusion detection • “Whitelist” or allow only specified programs to 
run, while blocking all others, to prevent malicious 
executables from running
• Web and e-mail filtering: Block messages with 
attachments *.exe, *.zip, *.rar, *.7z, *.js, *.wsf, *.docm, 
*.xlsm, *.pptm, *.rtf, *.msi, *.bat, *.com, *.cmd, 
*.hta, *.scr, *.pif, *.reg, *.vbs, *.cpl, and *.jar from 
suspicious sources
User interface Education • Legitimate messages should have a telephone 
number someone can call (i.e., out of band check), 
and a personal e-mail address that has a legitimate 
username that people can check in their local 
directory; e-mail and website links should display 
complete internet address (URL) to build trust
Prevention and 
preparation
• Use a virtual private network (VPN) to create a 
secure connection, even on a public unsecured 
network
• Establishing strict processes of removable media 
to prevent ransomware brought into the closed 
network
Intrusion detection • At the first sign of an alarm message, turn off the 
computer and report the incident to the IT support 
team immediately
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Dimension Role Recommendation
People Education • Do not follow unsolicited Web links in e-mails
• Train users on ransomware prevention strategies, 
how to identify malicious e-mails, and to avoid click-
ing on potentially weaponized attachments
Identity and access 
management
• Restrict users’ administrative privileges on local desk-
tops and laptops. For users who require administrative 
access, configure two accounts, one with administrative 
privileges that is used only when necessary, and one 
with more restrictive privileges that they use for routine 
activities, including reading e-mail and browsing the 
Internet
• Restrict the ability of users to “write” (i.e., create 
and delete files), on shared drives of departmental 
or group shares
• Establish policies and processes for protection of 
HIT systems in smart working environment using 
cloud computing and teleworking
Workflow and 
communication
Intrusion detection • Scan all software downloaded from the internet 
prior to executing
Risk assessment • Conduct simulated attacks to raise user’s awareness
• Conduct mock system recovery exercises
• Conduct regular risk assessments and auditing
Identity and access • Dual-factor authentication
• More stringent version of the Unique User 
Identification Standard to prevent generic user-
names and passwords
Incident response • System-wide password reset following a successful 
attack
Internal policies, 
procedures and 
environment
• Based on risk and business impact assessments, 
identify applications and data based on importance 
to the business (e.g., Tier 0—essential for business 
operations; Tier 1—1 hour downtime acceptable; 
Tier 2—1 day downtime acceptable; Tier 3—1 week 
downtime acceptable)Develop a plan to manage a 
ransomware situation accordingly
• Utilize the principle of “Least Privilege” to limit 
users’ access to only those systems and services 
required by their job
External rules and 
regulations
Preparation • Develop a Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA)-compliant information 
security regimen
Incident response • Contact your organization’s insurance provider, a 
computer forensics expert, and the FBI in the event 
of a successful attack
Measurement and 
monitoring
• Monitor network activity to identify suspicious 
activity
• Monitor the external environment for security 
incidents and address gaps and deficiencies as they 
are identified
• Review any extended downtime (e.g., ransomware) 
to identify potential root causes, and discuss future 
prevention or mitigating procedures
HIT = health information technology.
Table 2. 
An approach to preventing or mitigating ransomware attacks.
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Organizations (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN); 
systems that help organizations improve coordination speed and response time 
to temper the impact of international infectious disease outbreaks [30–32]. These 
systems are often used by IHS networks and volunteers in the field and, if com-
promised, could become a portal of entry for cyber-attack [31]. The attacks on the 
United Kingdom’s NHS demonstrate that even large state-sponsored institutions are 
not immune to cyber-attack [33].
Laboratory security is another important aspect for IHS, as the use and storage 
of sensitive pathogens make them attractive targets for attacks [33]. For this reason, 
the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) was created to help increase investment 
in global health security. GHSA is a 67-nation effort that hopes to increase the avail-
ability of laboratory systems for IHS use [34, 35].
5. Protecting your institution
As with most HIT issues, preventing a ransomware attack is a complex socio-
technical problem. Richard Schaeffer (2009), the U.S. National Security Agency 
(NSA) Information Assurance Director, testified to the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security that 80% of all 
ransomware attacks could be prevented by adhering to security measures already in 
place [36]. In addition to a sophisticated encryption algorithm, ransomware attacks 
often rely on some form of “social engineering,” or the psychological manipulation 
of people to gain their trust and lead them to divulge confidential information [15]. 
Solving these problems is a shared task between HIT users and those responsible 
for configuring, maintaining, and operating the HIT infrastructure. While prevent-
ing all ransomware attacks is not possible, there are several steps that healthcare 
organizations can take to reduce risk and mitigate harm (Table 2). Additionally, 
the U.S. Department Health and Human Services (HHS) offer guidelines on the 
best policies on how to properly secure electronic PHI. The need to maintain 
software updates and patches cannot be understated. For example, Microsoft Inc. 
had released a patch for the vulnerability exploited by WannaCry and NotPeyta 8 
weeks before the attack [8]. If systems had remained up to date, the impact of both 
malwares would likely have been significantly diminished.
Another approach to recover from a ransomware attack without needing to 
pay a ransom is by copying a file when it is being modified, storing one copy in a 
protected area, and allowing any changes to be made to the other [14]. ShieldFS© 
(NECSTLab, Milan, Italy) approaches this by creating a protected (i.e., read-only) 
copy of files when a process requests to modify or delete it [14]. If ShieldFS© 
determines that a process is malicious, the offending process is suspended and 
the copies can be restored, replacing the modified (encrypted) versions [14]. 
Conversely, Redemption uses a similar approach, but its technique creates a copy 
of each of the files targeted by the ransomware and then uses the Windows Kernel 
Development framework to redirect (or “reflect”) the write requests or filesystem 
operations (invoked by the ransomware to encrypt the target files) from the target 
files to the dummy copies in a transparent data buffer, hence leaving the original 
files intact [14].
Lastly, any ransomware attack should immediately be reported to the appro-
priate authorities [37]. In the U.S., federal law dictates that any breach undergo a 
thorough and properly documented analysis to determine if any unsecured PHI 
was compromised [38–40]. For anything other than a low probability of PHI 
compromise, one must inform the U.S. Department of HHS as soon as possible, 
and no later than 60-days post-breach (when over 500 person’s PHI is affected) 
[10, 37, 41].
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6. Conclusions
As HIT infrastructure struggles with new technology and security protocols, the 
industry is a prime target for medical information theft. Even worse, the healthcare 
industry is lagging behind other leading industries in securing vital data. Healthcare 
organizations must adapt to the ever-changing cyber-security trends and threats, 
such as ransomware, where critical infrastructure is exploited, and valuable patient 
data are extracted. It is imperative that time and funding are invested in maintain-
ing and ensuring the protection of healthcare technology and the confidentially of 
patient information from unauthorized access.
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